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Abstract 
This experiment examined whether different quantifications 
of the same damage award request ($175,000 lump sum, $10/
hour, $240/day, $7300/month for 2 years) influenced pain 
and suffering awards compared to no damage award request. 
Jury-eligible community members (N = 180) read a simulated 
personal injury case in which defendant liability already had 
been determined. Awards were: (1) larger for the $10/hour 
and $175,000 conditions than the $7300/month and control 
conditions and (2) more variable for the $10/hour condition 
than the $7300/month and control conditions. No differences 
emerged on ratings of the parties, their attorneys, or the diffi-
culty of picking a compensation figure. We discuss the theoret-
ical implications of our data for the anchoring and adjustment 
literature and the practical implications for legal professionals.
Keywords:  Per diem arguments, Anchoring and adjustment, 
Juror pain and suffering awards, Civil litigation
Jurors in personal injury cases must determine the eco-
nomic and noneconomic damages necessary to com-
pensate victims. Experts often provide testimony to 
help jurors determine economic losses such as medical 
expenses and lost wages, but little guidance is offered 
for noneconomic losses like pain and suffering (Greene 
& Bornstein, 2000; Wissler, Kuehn, & Saks, 2000). One 
well-studied exception is the plaintiff’s ad damnum or 
lump sum request for damages (Chapman & Bornstein, 
1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; Marti & Wissler, 2000). A 
second potential reference point for jurors that has re-
ceived virtually no empirical attention is the use of per 
diem arguments. The standard or “pure” per diem ar-
gument involves an attorney (typically the plaintiff’s) 
suggesting a small unit of time and then assigning it a 
small monetary value (e.g., $240/day) that represents its 
worth for the plaintiff. Although the name “per diem” 
implies that one day is the uniform time unit in these 
arguments, attorneys have used a variety of time units 
(hour, week, month, year) to quantify damage awards 
for jurors (King, 2003). 
Legal Status of Per Diem Arguments
Attorneys usually have considerable leeway in making 
oral arguments, but efforts to use per diem arguments 
have met with mixed success in U.S. courts (Pearson, 
2002). Some judges have ruled that per diem arguments 
are improper because they are based on speculation and 
cannot be supported by the evidence (Parker v. Artery, 
1995 ; Ramstad v. Lear Siegler Diversified Holdings Corp., 
1993) or that they mislead juries and result in excessive 
verdicts (Carchidi v. Rodenhiser, 1989 ; Johnson v. Colglazier, 
1965). In contrast, other judges have held that per diem 
arguments are permissible inferences drawn from the ev-
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idence (Cafferty v. Monson, 1985 ; Streeter v. Sears Roebuck 
& Co., 1988) and that it is logically inconsistent to allow a 
lump sum request without permitting attorneys to pres-
ent how that amount might be broken down to represent 
different periods of time (Beagle v. Vasold, 1966). 
These legal decisions involving per diem arguments 
and their underlying assumptions raise intriguing ques-
tions worthy of empirical investigation: Do per diem ar-
guments affect jurors’ noneconomic damage awards? 
If so, are these effects larger compared to when lump 
sums or no per diem arguments are used? We designed 
the present study to provide preliminary answers to 
these questions and to stimulate future research on at-
torneys’ use of per diem arguments in civil litigation. 
Previous Research on Per Diem Arguments
Empirical research on per diem arguments is surpris-
ingly scant. We are aware of only one other study that 
has examined the effect of per diem arguments on ju-
rors’ pain and suffering awards. In that study, research-
ers included seven variations of a per diem argument 
presented by the plaintiff’s attorney in a series of per-
sonal injury cases (Laughery, Paige, Bean, & Wogal-
ter, 2001). College students read one of five per diem 
amounts suggested to compensate the victim for his/her 
life expectancy ($1, $50, $100, $200, or $1000 per day), 
a multiple-rate condition consisting of a table that pre-
sented the first four rates, or a no per diem control. Even 
though participants’ damage awards in the control, $1, 
$50, $100, and multiple-rate arguments were not signifi-
cantly different from each other, they were smaller than 
those in the $200 condition, and all six versions led to 
smaller awards than the $1000/day argument condition. 
The Laughery et al. (2001) experiment is important 
because it was the first to investigate the effects of dif-
ferent per diem arguments on jurors’ noneconomic 
damage awards. At the same time, however, the study’s 
main finding that larger per diem arguments led to 
larger awards seems to be more indicative of jurors’ 
general tendency to anchor on amounts provided by at-
torneys (making larger awards in response to larger re-
quests) than it is an investigation of how different dol-
lar/time quantifications of the same absolute amount 
for the plaintiff’s pain and suffering (e.g., $10/hour ver-
sus $240/day) would influence jurors’ awards. 
Anchoring and Jurors’ Noneconomic Damage Awards
Social scientists have discovered that people rely on var-
ious heuristic principles to reduce the complexity of dif-
ferent judgment tasks, especially those involving un-
certainty (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Although these 
heuristics are quite useful, they sometimes lead to trou-
blesome and systematic errors. One common heuris-
tic involves an “anchoring and adjustment” process 
in which people make estimates by starting at an ini-
tial value that eventually is adjusted to yield a final an-
swer. Sources of the initial value or starting point may 
be external (suggested by another person) or internal 
(based on a partially performed computation) and both 
exert an influence on the final judgment rendered. In 
short, “different starting points yield different estimates, 
which are biased toward the initial values” (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1974, p. 1128). 
Effects of Anchors on Award Size and Variability
Researchers have documented anchoring and adjust-
ment effects in various civil trial simulations (Chap-
man & Bornstein, 1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; Marti & 
Wissler, 2000). These effects generally take one of two 
forms: assimilation (movement of the response toward 
the anchor) or contrast (movement of the response away 
from the anchor). College students in an experiment by 
Chapman and Bornstein (1996) awarded more money to 
the plaintiff as the size of her attorney’s lump sum re-
quest ($100, $20,000, $5 million, or $1 billion) increased. 
Yet more recent research by Marti and Wissler (2000) 
suggests that there are limits to how much plaintiff at-
torneys should ask for and that too large a request may 
backfire. In that experiment, the plaintiff requested ei-
ther $1.5 million, $15 million, or $25 million for his pain 
and suffering after a workplace accident that was the 
defendant’s fault. College students awarded the least 
amount of money in the $1.5 million condition; how-
ever, the average award was greater in the $15 mil-
lion condition than in the $25 million condition. Based 
on those findings, Marti and Wissler echoed the earlier 
sentiments of Chapman and Bornstein by agreeing that 
“the more you ask for, the more you get” but also cau-
tioned “be careful what you ask for.” 
Anchors appear to affect the variability of mock ju-
rors’ pain and suffering awards similarly to how they 
affect award size. In general, award variability increases 
as the size of the award request increases (Malouff & 
Schutte, 1989), although the data on this point are some-
what inconsistent (Marti & Wissler, 2000). 
Psychological Processes Underlying the Effects of An-
chors on Awards
Whether examining the effects of anchors on award size 
or variability, it is crucial to consider the underlying 
psychological processes. Marti and Wissler (2000) sug-
gested three possible factors that determine whether a 
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particular anchor produces assimilation or contrast. The 
first two factors involve the perceived discrepancy be-
tween the anchor and either the target stimulus or the 
individual’s initial position. Essentially, more moderate 
anchors tend to produce assimilation whereas more ex-
treme anchors tend to produce contrast. Hence, an at-
torney’s suggested damage award (anchor) that is ex-
tremely discrepant from the plaintiff’s perceived pain 
and suffering (target stimulus) or a juror’s internal sense 
of appropriate compensation for the harm suffered (in-
dividual’s initial position) is more likely to result in con-
trast than a more moderate, better-matching award. The 
third factor involves whether an individual believes 
his or her judgment is being influenced by the sug-
gested anchor. Anchors that are perceived as deliber-
ate attempts to bias an individual’s judgment are likely 
to result in contrast or no movement toward the anchor 
rather than assimilation. 
Anchors in the form of per diem arguments or lump 
sum requests also may affect certain trial-related at-
titudes and beliefs, which in turn could influence the 
size and variability of jurors’ awards. Past research has 
shown that lump sum anchors have little effect on the 
plaintiff’s perceived pain and suffering (Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler, 2000), but they can in-
crease jurors’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s selfishness 
when the lump sum is characterized as being larger 
than the average request in similar cases (Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996). Less is known about whether lump 
sums influence jurors’ evaluations of the attorneys’ clos-
ing arguments or the perceived difficulty of picking an 
exact figure to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries, 
and no research has addressed the effects of per diem 
arguments on these attitudes. 
Overview
We designed the present experiment to examine the ef-
fects of different dollar/time per diem arguments, a 
lump sum, or no award recommendation on jurors’ 
noneconomic damage awards in a simulated personal 
injury case in which liability already had been estab-
lished. In addition to this novel anchor manipulation, 
we sought to improve the ecological validity of research 
on jurors’ damage awards by sampling jury-eligible 
community members instead of college students.
To determine the specific amount requested in the 
per diem argument and lump sum conditions, we first 
presented 35 jury-eligible community members the writ-
ten trial stimulus (see “Method” for a detailed descrip-
tion) and asked how much money the plaintiff should 
receive for the 2 years of pain and suffering she expe-
rienced as a result of the defendant’s negligence. We 
did not include any award recommendation in this ver-
sion of the trial. Participants’ pain and suffering awards 
ranged from $2,000 to $500,000 with a mean award of 
$61,992 (Mdn = $24,000, SD = $118,033). 
Consistent with earlier experiments in this area (e.g., 
Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Hinsz & Indahl, 1995; 
Marti & Wissler, 2000), we wanted the total amount re-
quested by the plaintiff’s attorney to represent a moder-
ately high anchor that should produce assimilation com-
pared to when no damage award recommendation was 
included. We used a lump sum amount of $175,000 be-
cause it was nearly three times the average award of our 
pilot participants, fell one standard deviation above that 
mean value, and could be divided evenly into whole 
dollar amounts and time units ($10/hour, $240/day, 
and $7300/month). 
Hypotheses
We developed four specific hypotheses regarding the 
effects of the damage award recommendation variable 
on mock jurors’ decisions. Our first two hypotheses fo-
cused on the size and variability of participants’ pain 
and suffering awards. Consistent with previous anchor-
ing research, we predicted that a moderately high an-
chor presented to participants in the form of either a per 
diem argument or lump sum would increase the size 
and variability of pain and suffering awards (assimila-
tion) compared to when no damage award recommen-
dation was presented. We did not anticipate that a com-
bined Per Diem Argument-versus-Lump Sum contrast, 
or individual comparisons among the three levels of per 
diem argument and the lump sum amount, would re-
veal any differences because the anchors in these condi-
tions were all functionally equivalent; however, we con-
ducted these analyses to empirically test the assumption 
made by some courts that per diem arguments lead to 
larger awards and therefore are prejudicial.
Our third hypothesis addressed the question of 
whether per diem argument or lump sum anchors 
would affect mock jurors’ beliefs about damage awards 
and their perceptions of the parties. Specifically, we pre-
dicted that participants who received the lump sum 
amount would find it easiest to pick a compensation fig-
ure, followed by participants who received the per diem 
arguments, and followed lastly by participants who re-
ceived no damage award recommendation. This hy-
pothesis was largely exploratory in nature; however, we 
reasoned that participants would find the compensation 
task to be more difficult in the per diem argument an-
chor conditions compared to the lump sum amount con-
dition because the per diem arguments required partici-
pants to perform the dollar/time calculation to arrive at 
a final damage award. In contrast, the lump sum condi-
tion simply provided this amount for participants with-
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out requiring any additional calculations. With respect 
to the no award recommendation condition, we antici-
pated that participants would perceive any help (per 
diem argument or lump sum) provided by the plaintiff’s 
attorney as simplifying the compensation task com-
pared to when no information was provided. By pro-
viding guidance, any recommendation should likewise 
make the plaintiff attorney’s closing argument (which 
contained the manipulation) more influential than when 
no recommendation was provided.
Previous research has shown that different lump sum 
requests generally did not change mock jurors’ percep-
tions of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering (Chapman & 
Bornstein, 1996; Marti & Wissler, 2000). Based on those 
findings, the equivalence of the total request across con-
ditions, and the fact that we deliberately included a 
moderately high anchor designed to produce assimila-
tion and not contrast, we did not expect the manipula-
tion to influence participants’ perceptions of the plain-
tiff’s pain and suffering or impressions of the plaintiff 
and defendant. 
Our fourth and final hypothesis predicted that par-
ticipants’ damage awards would be positively related to 
the plaintiff perception variables and negatively related 
to the defendant perception variables. 
Method 
Participants
One hundred-eighty community members residing in 
Southern California volunteered for our study or par-
ticipated in exchange for $10.00. We recruited commu-
nity members by distributing a flyer that described the 
research participation opportunity in our local commu-
nity and by offering students extra-credit for referring ex-
tended family members to participate in the research. All 
participants met the California requirements for jury eli-
gibility: a U.S. citizen who is at least 18 years of age, able 
to understand English, and who has not been convicted 
of a felony (California Code of Civil Procedure, §203). 
Community members averaged 36 years in age and 
most were females (58%) and had been in at least one 
automobile accident (64%) in which they were at fault 
(60%). Most participants had served on a jury before 
(85%) but had not been a party in actual legal proceed-
ings (83%). Of those with prior legal involvement, 54% 
were plaintiffs in civil cases and 46% were defendants 
in either civil or criminal proceedings. Community 
members came from a variety of racial and ethnic back-
grounds including: Caucasians (37%), Hispanics, Cen-
tral/South Americans, Mexicans (24%), African Ameri-
cans (4%), Middle Easterners (9%), and Asians (26%).
Trial Stimulus
Participants read a 5-page summary of an automo-
bile negligence case that was based on Abbinante v. 
O’Connell (1996) and included introductory remarks 
from the judge, opening statements/closing arguments 
from both attorneys, summarized testimony from four 
witnesses (plaintiff, defendant, treating physician, and 
physical therapist), and the standard judicial instruc-
tions used in California civil cases. 
The basic fact pattern of the case was that an inatten-
tive driver (defendant) accidentally struck an 18-year-old 
female pedestrian (plaintiff) when swerving to avoid a 
rearend collision with the car in front of him. The plain-
tiff suffered compression fractures to her lumbar verte-
brae and spent two nights in intensive care. After being 
discharged from the hospital, she continued to experi-
ence intense back pain, as well as limited physical mo-
bility, weakness and numbness in her legs, and severe 
headaches. The plaintiff took daily doses of prescription 
painkillers for her back injuries and was forced to wear 
a hyperextension back brace. The plaintiff’s injuries pre-
vented her from participating in many activities she had 
previously enjoyed on a regular basis, including sports 
and other recreational activities. Two years passed before 
the plaintiff fully recovered from her injuries.
At trial, the plaintiff’s treating physician testified on 
her behalf as an expert witness. He explained that the 
plaintiff’s injuries were the common result of compres-
sion fractures. The symptoms of numbness and weak-
ness in her legs were caused by swelling at the fracture 
site and increased pressure on her spinal cord. He also 
testified that frequent, severe headaches were typical 
symptoms of similar back injuries and that the medica-
tion he prescribed was necessary for the plaintiff to cope 
with the tremendous amount of pain she was experienc-
ing during her recovery.
The physical therapist who cared for the plaintiff also 
testified as an expert witness. She testified that hyperex-
tension back braces are common in cases of compression 
fractures in order to keep the spine stable and to pro-
tect the spinal column during recovery. She explained 
that for the types of injuries sustained by the plaintiff, 
treatment can involve years of therapy and that patients 
often are not able to work or participate in any vigor-
ous physical activity for an extended period of time. She 
concluded by noting that the nature and duration of the 
plaintiff’s physical therapy was typical and not out of 
the ordinary.
Design and Dependent Measures
The study consisted of a 5 Damage Award Recommen-
dation ($10/hour, $240/day, $7300/month, $175,000 
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lump sum, No Award Recommendation) between-
groups factorial design. This variable was manipulated 
in the plaintiff attorney’s closing argument. For exam-
ple, in the $10/hour condition he concluded by stating: 
When deciding how much money to award Rebecca 
[plaintiff], we ask that you keep in mind one simple 
question: How much money is Rebecca’s two years 
of physical pain and mental suffering worth? We ar-
gue that $10.00 for every hour of pain and suffering 
would reasonably compensate Rebecca for her in-
juries. Please ensure that justice is served today by 
awarding Rebecca the compensation she deserves 
for the pain and suffering she endured due to Mr. 
Rumson’s [defendant] negligence.
The other conditions substituted different amounts 
($240/day, $7300/month, or $175,000) and the control 
condition included the same language above minus the 
sentence containing the specific monetary recommen-
dation. The defense attorney’s closing argument did 
not address the specific amount requested by the plain-
tiff’s attorney; however, he concluded by stating “Jus-
tice is not served by awarding the plaintiff the excessive 
amount of money she is seeking in this action” in every 
condition.
We included a series of dependent measures to de-
termine the effects of our experimental manipulation 
on mock jurors’ decisions. The first item was an open-
ended question asking participants how much money 
they thought the plaintiff should receive to compen-
sate for her pain and suffering only. Next, participants 
used 7-point, Likert-type scales to indicate the severity 
of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering (1 = Not at all, 7 = 
Extremely), overall evaluations of the plaintiff and de-
fendant (1 = Extremely Negative, 7 = Extremely Posi-
tive), how influential each of the attorneys’ closing ar-
guments was (1 = Not at all Influential, 7 = Extremely 
Influential), and the difficulty of picking an exact fig-
ure to compensate the plaintiff for her injuries (1 = Ex-
tremely Easy, 7 = Extremely Difficult). Finally, partici-
pants completed a multiple-choice manipulation check 
to ensure that they were able to identify the appropriate 
damage award request provided by the plaintiff’s attor-
ney in each of their respective conditions and rated their 
level of motivation when reading the trial stimulus and 
determining damages (1 = Not at all Motivated, 7 = Ex-
tremely Motivated).
After completing those dependent measures, partic-
ipants provided demographic information about their 
gender, age, jury eligibility, racial/ethnic identity, auto-
mobile accident history (number of accidents and fault), 
and previous involvement in legal proceedings (civil or 
criminal, plaintiff or defendant). 
Procedure
We collected data in groups of 5–20 participants. Af-
ter providing informed consent, participants were in-
structed that the defendant already had been found li-
able and that their task was to determine how much 
money the plaintiff should receive for her pain and suf-
fering. Participants then read the trial summary and 
completed the dependent measures. Participants were 
randomly assigned to condition and did not deliber-
ate or confer with one another at any point during the 
study. Once participants completed the study, they 
were debriefed and thanked for their participation.
Results 
Manipulation Check
Mock jurors noticed the variations in the plaintiff attor-
ney’s damage award recommendation. The percentage 
of participants in each condition who reported the cor-
rect damage award recommendation was: 95% ($10/
hour), 80% ($240/day), 100% ($7300/month), 93% 
($175,000), and 100% (none). All participants were in-
cluded in the main analyses to ensure adequate statisti-
cal power.1 
We also conducted a one-way ANOVA with five lev-
els of the Damage Award Recommendation variable to 
ensure that there were no systematic differences in par-
ticipants’ self-reported levels of motivation while read-
ing the trial and determining damages. Random as-
signment was successful, with no differences emerging 
across conditions, F(4, 175) = 0.13, p = .97, partial η 2 = 
.01, Grand M = 4.65, SD = 1.59. 
Data Analytic Strategy
The amount of dollars awarded for the plaintiff’s pain 
and suffering was the major dependent variable in this 
experiment. Preliminary analyses revealed that partici-
pants’ raw dollar awards were highly variable and pos-
itively skewed. Following procedures recommended by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), awards that were greater 
than two standard deviations above the mean in each 
condition were recoded to the award amount at two 
standard deviations. This transformation has been used 
in other damage award research (e.g., Saks, Hollinger, 
Wissler, Evans, & Hart, 1997) and is preferred over other 
1. We reran all the analyses excluding the 12 participants who did not answer the manipulation check question correctly and the pattern of effects 
across the dependent measures was identical to when these participants were included.
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methods such as logarithmically transforming or trun-
cating the data for several reasons. A logarithmic trans-
formation of damage awards recodes all of the data (not 
just the outliers) and the resulting values are difficult to 
interpret in a meaningful way. This type of transforma-
tion would have been particularly problematic in our 
study because we were interested in examining differ-
ences in the variability of damage awards as a function 
of experimental condition. Truncation or the elimination 
of extreme values is less desirable than the transforma-
tion we performed because it results in the loss of data. 
In total, two awards were recoded in each of the $10/
hour, $7300/month, and $175,000 conditions and one 
award was recoded in each of the $240/day and no 
award recommendation conditions. After this transfor-
mation, the distribution of our pain and suffering award 
data showed no serious departures from normality.
We subjected participants’ pain and suffering awards, 
impressions of the plaintiff and defendant, evaluations 
of the attorneys’ closing arguments, and perceived diffi-
culty of picking an exact figure to compensate the plain-
tiff for her injuries to a multivariate analysis of variance 
(MANOVA) to explore whether the composite of these 
six dependent measures differed as a function of the 
Damage Award Recommendation variable. The Pillai’s 
Trace criterion revealed a statistically significant effect, 
Mult. F(28, 676) = 1.99, p = .002, partial η2 = .09. We fol-
lowed up the significant multivariate main effect for the 
Damage Award Recommendation variable using uni-
variate F tests for each of the six dependent measures. 
Hypothesis 1: Size of pain and suffering awards — 
The test for the pain and suffering award measure was 
statistically significant (see Table 1). Tukey’s post hoc 
comparisons revealed that participants’ pain and suffer-
ing awards were larger for the $10/hour per diem ar-
gument and $175,000 lump sum conditions compared 
to the $7300/month per diem argument and no award 
recommendation conditions. The difference between 
participants’ awards in the $240/day condition and all 
other conditions was not statistically significant. 
We also conducted two contrasts that combined par-
ticipants’ damage awards across all three per diem argu-
ment levels (M = $107,771; SD = $130,036) and compared 
them to damage awards in the lump sum only condition 
and the control condition. Neither contrast reached tra-
ditional levels of statistical significance, F(1, 146) = 3.62, 
p = .059, partial η2 = .02 and F(1, 146) = 3.37, p = .069, 
partial η2 = .03, respectively. A final contrast testing the 
effect of a linear trend across the three per diem argu-
ment levels was statistically significant, F(1, 105) = 7.84, p 
= .006, partial η2 = .07. As the dollar amount in each per 
diem argument increased, participants’ damage awards 
decreased in a linear fashion (see Table 1).2
Hypothesis 2: Variability in pain and suffering awards 
— We examined the effect of our Damage Award Rec-
ommendation manipulation on the variability of par-
ticipants’ pain and suffering awards using a procedure 
described by Levene (1960) and used by other civil jury 
researchers (Marti & Wissler, 2000; Saks et al., 1997). 
We calculated deviation scores by taking the absolute 
value of the distance between each participant’s award 
and the mean award for his/her experimental condi-
tion. We then subjected these deviation scores to a one-
way between-subjects ANOVA with five levels of the 
Damage Award Recommendation variable. This analy-
sis revealed a statistically significant effect, F(4, 175) = 
4.33, p = .002, partial η2 = .09. Tukey’s post hoc compar-
isons revealed that the $10/hour per diem argument in-
creased the variability in participants’ pain and suf-
fering awards compared to the $7300/month and no 
award recommendation conditions (see Table 1).3 No 
other comparisons reached traditional levels of statisti-
cal significance. 
We also conducted two contrasts that combined par-
ticipants’ deviation scores across all three per diem ar-
gument levels (M = $79,562; SD = $96,493,036) and com-
pared them to the deviation scores in the lump sum 
only condition and the control condition. The Per Diem 
Argument-versus-Lump Sum contrast was nonsignifi-
cant, F(1, 146) = 1.16, p = .28, partial η2 = .01; however, 
the Per Diem Argument-versus-Control was statistically 
significant, F(1, 134) = 4.67, p = .03, partial η2 = .03. A fi-
nal contrast testing the effect of a linear trend across the 
three per diem argument levels was statistically signif-
icant, F(1, 105) = 8.67, p = .004, partial η2 = .08. As the 
dollar amount in each per diem argument increased, the 
variability in participants’ damage awards decreased in 
a linear fashion (see Table 1). 
2. We acknowledge that this final contrast did not test an a priori hypothesis. It was recommended by a reviewer to test what appeared to be a lin-
ear trend in the size of participants’ damage awards as a function of per diem argument in the univariate follow-up test for the statistically sig-
nificant Damage Award Recommendation effect in the overall MANOVA.
3. One additional insight that we gained from the Levene’s test was that our univariate F test on the size of participants’ pain and suffering awards 
violated the homogeneity of variance assumption of ANOVA because the variability in awards was not constant across experimental condi-
tions. To ensure that this heterogeneity of variance did not affect our results in any way, we performed a logarithmic transformation on the pain 
and suffering award variable and reran the univariate F test. Without exception, the pattern of results was identical to when the nontransformed 
awards were used. 
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Hypothesis 3: Attitudinal and belief measures — The 
other univariate tests for the effects of per diem argu-
ment on participants’ perceptions of the plaintiff’s pain 
and suffering, overall impressions of the plaintiff and 
defendant, evaluations of the attorneys’ closing argu-
ments, and the difficulty of picking an exact figure to 
compensate the plaintiff for her perceived injuries were 
not statistically significant (see Table 1). 
Hypothesis 4: Correlations among measures — Partic-
ipants’ damage awards were positively related to their 
perceptions of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering, impres-
sions of the plaintiff, and evaluations of the plaintiff at-
torney’s closing argument at a statistically significant 
level (see Table 2). Damage awards were negatively re-
lated to participants’ evaluations of the defense attorney’s 
closing argument. All three plaintiff measures were pos-
itively correlated. For the defendant measures, only par-
ticipants’ impression of the defendant and the defense 
attorney’s closing argument were positively correlated. 
Finally, participants’ ratings of the plaintiff and defense 
attorney closing arguments were negatively related. 
Discussion
Previous research on jurors’ noneconomic damage 
awards has presented participants with lump sum re-
quests that vary in size only and found that moderate 
anchors produce assimilation whereas extreme anchors 
produce contrast (Chapman & Bornstein, 1996; Marti & 
Wissler, 2000). What remained to be seen until now is 
how mock jurors respond to the same damage award 
recommendation broken down into different dollar/
time units. 
Major Findings
Award Size
Depending on the exact dollar/time quantification used, 
participants’ pain and suffering awards were similar to 
or different from the amounts awarded when a lump 
sum or no damage award recommendation was pro-
vided. The per diem argument containing the smallest 
dollar/time quantification ($10/hour) or the $175,000 
lump sum request both increased participants’ awards 
Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and univariate effects of damage award recommendation on dependent measures
Dependent measure                  Means (SD)           Univariate effect of damage
            award recommendation
 $10/hour  $240/day  $7300/month  $175,000  None  F  df  p  partial η2
Award in dollars  149,614a 99,037a,b 66,316b 151,758a 61,257b 4.34  4,175  0.002  0.09 
 (186,369) (73,580) (66,434) (154,611) (60,701)    
Award deviation  117,645a 60,688a,b 53,417b 97,031a,b 39,446b 4.33  4,175  0.002  0.09  
     score in dollars (143,312) (40,281) (38,353) (119,415) (44,708)
Pain and suffering severity  5.70 (1.22)  5.57 (1.17)  5.91 (0.95)  5.36 (1.25)  5.30 (1.24)  1.55  4,175  0.19  0.03
Plaintiff  4.90 (1.43)  4.86 (1.38)  4.85 (1.15)  4.95 (1.32)  5.20 (1.16)  0.39  4,175  0.82  0.01
Plaintiff closing  3.95 (1.58)  3.97 (1.67)  4.12 (1.85)  4.64 (1.30)  4.50 (1.20)  1.61  4,175  0.17  0.04
Defendant  4.08 (0.89)  3.69 (1.11)  4.00 (1.25)  3.50 (1.25)  4.03 (0.77)  2.12  4,175  0.08  0.05
Defendant closing  3.78 (1.49)  4.06 (1.78)  3.82 (1.78)  3.86 (1.48)  4.10 (1.63)  0.28  4,175  0.89  0.01
Compensate difficulty  4.74 (1.55)  4.26 (1.38)  4.63 (1.64)  4.79 (1.57)  3.90 (1.73)  1.91  4,175  0.11  0.04
Within each row, means with different superscripts were significantly different at p ≤ .05
Table 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations among dependent measures
 M  SD  1  2  3  4  5  6  7
1. Award in dollars  126,083  214,282  —  0.22**  0.22**  0.16*  -0.11  –0.16*  0.31
2. Pain and suffering severity  5.57  1.18   —  0.39**  0.29**  –0.13  –0.09  0.03
3. Plaintiff  4.94  1.29    —  0.31**  –0.12  –0.07  0.01
4. Plaintiff closing  4.24  1.55     —  –0.07  –0.20**  0.12
5. Defendant  3.84  1.09      —  0.15*  –0.05
6. Defendant closing  3.91  1.61       —  0.04
7. Compensate difficulty  4.50  1.59        —
* Correlation significant at p ≤ .05
** Correlation significant at p ≤ .01
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relative to control participants whereas the per diem ar-
gument containing the largest dollar/time quantifica-
tion ($7300/month) did not. These findings suggest that 
assimilation effects may be moderated by the format 
in which the damage award recommendation is pre-
sented to jurors in addition to its size. Moreover, even 
though damage awards increased in the $10/hour and 
$175,000 lump sum conditions, participants did not sim-
ply accept the plaintiff attorney’s damage award recom-
mendation outright: on average, they awarded approxi-
mately $25,000 less than what was requested.
The assimilation effects in the $10/hour and $175,000 
lump sum conditions are not particularly surprising. 
Recall that we deliberately chose an award amount that 
was moderately high relative to participants’ awards 
when no damage award recommendation was pro-
vided. As such, our anchor was more likely to produce 
assimilation than contrast because it was not extremely 
discrepant from the target stimulus or participants’ ini-
tial judgments and it should not have been perceived as 
being overly biased (Marti & Wissler, 2000). However, 
the same can be said about the other per diem argument 
conditions because they were functionally equivalent in 
size, and yet neither the $240/day nor $7300/month an-
chor produced the assimilation effects observed in the 
$10/hour and $175,000 conditions. 
Perhaps the most straightforward conclusion we can 
draw from this result is that mock jurors did not per-
form the calculations suggested by the plaintiff’s attor-
ney in all of the per diem argument conditions. Had 
they relied on the per diem arguments, their damage 
awards would not have differed because all three dol-
lar/time quantifications resulted in the same amount 
as the lump sum request ($175,000). Yet it does not ap-
pear that participants disregarded the per diem argu-
ments altogether either. The fact that pain and suffer-
ing awards were virtually identical in the $10/hour 
and lump sum conditions suggests that participants in 
this condition performed the calculations contained in 
the per diem argument. Why then did participants re-
spond differently to the $10/hour and $7300/month 
per diem arguments? We can begin by ruling out the 
possibility that participants simply did not attend 
to our experimental manipulation because the over-
whelming majority of participants passed the manip-
ulation check. In addition, no differences emerged for 
participants’ self-reported motivation across the exper-
imental conditions.
Instead, what seems more plausible is that partic-
ipants attended to the damage award recommenda-
tions but perceived the $7300/month per diem argu-
ment to be excessive compared to the actual worth 
of the plaintiff’s pain and suffering or their intuitive, 
gut-level sense of an appropriate award amount (e.g., 
“It’s only $10/hour.” versus “Wow, that’s $7300/
month!”). They also may have viewed the larger dol-
lar/time quantification as an unfair or biased attempt 
to persuade them. Any one of these factors would re-
sult in no movement toward the anchor or contrast ef-
fects (Marti & Wissler, 2000). 
To determine whether participants viewed the 
$7300/month per diem argument as a larger, more ex-
treme request than the other per diem arguments in our 
study, we conducted a short follow-up survey in which 
we presented 30 jury-eligible college students a sheet of 
paper with one question on each side. On the front, we 
listed the three per diem arguments ($10/hour, $240/
day, or $7300/month) and asked participants to cir-
cle the per diem argument that they thought would re-
sult in the largest damage award for a 2-year period. 
Once they answered the first question, we asked partic-
ipants to turn the paper over and indicate whether they 
focused more on the dollar amount or time unit when 
answering the first question. Twenty-two participants 
(73%) circled the $7300/month per diem argument, 
eight (27%) circled the $240/day per diem argument, 
and none chose the $10/hour per diem argument in re-
sponse to the first question. For the second question, 21 
participants (70%) reported that they focused more on 
the dollar amount compared to nine participants (30%) 
who reported focusing more on the time unit.
These data offer some additional insight into jurors’ 
reactions to per diem arguments. When asked to deter-
mine noneconomic damages and presented per diem 
arguments containing different dollar/time quantifi-
cations of the same amount, mock jurors appear to (1) 
focus more on the dollar amounts contained in those 
arguments rather than the time units, and (2) perceive 
larger dollar amounts as yielding larger awards even 
though they are accompanied by correspondingly larger 
time units. Why does this occur? Perhaps the over-
lap between what the compensation task requires and 
what the attorney’s per diem argument provides causes 
people to focus almost exclusively on the specific dol-
lar amount included in the attorney’s per diem argu-
ment. This explanation is also consistent with previous 
research indicating that anchors exert the strongest in-
fluence on people’s decisions when the anchor and re-
sponse item are presented on compatible scales (Mar-
kovsky, 1988; Chapman & Johnson, 1994). 
Finally, it is important to note that our Per Diem Ar-
gument-versus-Lump Sum and Per Diem Argument-
versus-Control contrasts revealed that the combined ef-
fects of per diem arguments on damage award size were 
no different from those of the lump sum or control con-
ditions. What appears to matter is not the use of a per 
diem argument per se, but instead the size of the dollar/
time quantification contained therein.
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Award Variability
Similar to previous research (Malouff & Schutte, 1989; 
Marti & Wissler, 2000), participants’ damage awards be-
came increasingly variable when presented a moder-
ately high anchor compared to no damage award rec-
ommendation. However, this only occurred for the $10/
hour per diem argument condition. These findings bear 
a strong resemblance to the award size data and can 
be best understood in a similar fashion. By knowing in 
advance that participants in our pilot study awarded 
on average $62,000 for the plaintiff’s injuries, we were 
able to select a damage award recommendation that 
was moderately higher than what control participants 
would award. Thus, receiving the moderate anchor in-
creased the variability of jurors’ awards compared to 
when they received no damage award recommendation 
and tended to award around $62,000. 
This explanation accounts for the increased variabil-
ity in the $10/hour per diem argument condition, but 
what about the lack of effects for the other conditions 
that contained different quantifications of the same dam-
age award recommendation? The fact that the variability 
in participants’ damage awards for the $7300/month per 
diem argument was significantly smaller than for the $10/
hour per diem argument and no different from the con-
trol condition suggests once again that participants per-
ceived this amount to be extremely (as opposed to moder-
ately) discrepant from what was appropriate based on the 
plaintiff’s pain and suffering or their initial award judg-
ments. These conditions have been shown to produce 
contrast effects or a lack of assimilation effects consistent 
with our findings (Marti & Wissler, 2000). With respect to 
the $175,000 lump sum amount, the two previous experi-
ments that examined award variability used multiple re-
quests that varied in size (as opposed to different quan-
tifications of the same amount) and those awards were 
much larger in size relative to pilot study control awards 
than our recommendation was. Anchors that are more ex-
treme, by definition, are less restrictive and provide more 
opportunity for variability than moderate anchors. Per-
haps if we had included a larger lump sum (and larger 
per diem arguments, for that matter), we would have ob-
served more differences in award variability. 
That said, however, anchor size alone cannot explain 
why we observed increased award variability in some 
conditions ($10/hour) and not others ($175,000). After 
all, the damage award recommendations in these condi-
tions were functionally equivalent when calculated for 
the plaintiff’s recovery period. It may be the case that 
per diem arguments lead to more variable awards than 
lump sums because they provide more opportunity for 
adjustment: there is simply more to tinker with. Lump 
sum requests can be adjusted in terms of dollar amount 
only whereas per diem arguments can be adjusted in 
terms of dollar amount or time units. 
Attitudinal Measures
Results did not reveal statistically significant differ-
ences on any of the attitudinal measures as a function 
of the Damage Award Recommendation variable. Sev-
eral characteristics of the present study increase our 
confidence that the null effects associated with the Dam-
age Award Recommendation variable were not statisti-
cal artifacts. First, participants’ responses to the manip-
ulation check question indicated that they attended to 
the experimental manipulation when reading the trial 
stimulus. Second, post hoc power analyses confirmed 
that our study had sufficient power to detect differences 
should they have existed. Power was equal to .85 to de-
tect a medium-sized effect given the number of partici-
pants in our sample and α = .05 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, 
& Buchner, 2007). Third, as further evidence supporting 
the statistical power of the tests, differences relatively 
small in size (partial η2 = .09; Cohen, 1988) reached tra-
ditional levels of statistical significance in several of the 
analyses used to examine our data. Finally, there was 
no evidence that the null effects were the result of a re-
stricted response range. Participants’ responses varied 
greatly within and among the various dependent mea-
sures, and there was no evidence of a floor or ceiling ef-
fect. For these reasons, we are confident that the null 
effects associated with the damage award request vari-
able reflect a true lack of differences in participants’ re-
sponses rather than a statistical artifact. 
The fact that different quantifications of the same 
damage award request did not affect participants’ per-
ceptions of the parties or their attorneys is reassuring 
because these requests are designed primarily to sim-
plify jurors’ task of compensating the plaintiff. If the 
Damage Award Recommendation variable had influ-
enced participants’ attitudes toward the parties or their 
attorneys, this would have supported legal arguments 
and court rulings that these types of arguments are prej-
udicial; however, that was not the case.
We were surprised by the lack of differences in par-
ticipants’ perceived difficulty of the damage determina-
tion task and do not have a sound explanation for this 
finding. Perhaps a self-presentation bias influenced par-
ticipants such that they reported finding the compen-
sation task easier than it really was or that they were 
not influenced by the plaintiff attorney’s closing argu-
ment in order to be perceived more favorably by the ex-
perimenter (Baumeister, 1982). Other research by Nis-
bett and Wilson (1977) has shown that participants have 
limited awareness of their cognitive processes and that 
their reports concerning these are often incorrect. 
P e r  D i e m  v e r s u s  L u m P  s u m  r e q u e s t s  o n  P a i n  a n D  s u f f e r i n g  a w a r D s   173
The correlational analyses revealed that damage 
awards increased as participants evaluated the plain-
tiff, her attorney, and the degree of pain and suffering 
more positively. This finding makes sense, given that 
perceptions of the plaintiff (and especially the plaintiff’s 
pain and suffering) are the yardstick by which jurors are 
asked to measure noneconomic damages. Participants’ 
overall impressions of the defendant were unrelated to 
the size of their damage awards—only a small but sta-
tistically significant negative relationship between dam-
age awards and perceptions of the defense attorney’s 
closing argument was detected. This outcome is legally 
appropriate because noneconomic damages should be 
based on the plaintiff’s perceived pain and suffering 
and not perceptions of the defendant.
Limitations and Implications for Legal Professionals
Before discussing the implications of our research, we 
must acknowledge certain methodological features that 
may limit the generalizability of our findings. The writ-
ten trial summary we developed, although based on an 
actual case, constituted a relatively impoverished stim-
ulus compared to the courtroom experience of jurors 
in a real case. Participants rendered judgments inde-
pendently of one another without any tangible conse-
quences for the plaintiff or defendant. Previous research 
has shown, however, that the verisimilitude of jury sim-
ulation research does not substantially affect its results 
(Bornstein, 1999; Kramer & Kerr, 1989) and that jurors’ 
pre- and post-deliberation verdicts typically do not dif-
fer (Hastie, Penrod, & Pennington, 1983). 
It is also important to keep in mind that we informed 
mock jurors in our study that defendant liability had al-
ready been established and asked them to determine the 
plaintiff’s noneconomic damages only for a fixed period 
of time (past pain and suffering). This was done in or-
der to simplify the task and avoid dealing with ambig-
uous projections about the probable duration of future 
pain and suffering. Consequently, our data do not ad-
dress the possibility that per diem arguments could in-
fluence jurors’ liability decisions, economic damage 
awards, or future pain and suffering awards. It is possi-
ble that per diem arguments would exert a stronger in-
fluence in cases involving both past and future pain and 
suffering for extended periods of time. 
With respect to the use of per diem arguments by 
attorneys in actual cases, we do not know how often 
per diem arguments contain specific dollar amounts 
or whether they are presented to jurors in lieu of or in 
addition to a lump sum amount. Our experiment pit-
ted different per diem arguments against an equivalent 
lump sum amount. As such, we do not know whether 
the reduced damage awards we observed for the larger 
dollar/time quantification would emerge when the per 
diem argument is accompanied by a lump sum amount.
Finally, we openly acknowledge that we did not ex-
pect mock jurors’ damage awards to vary across the 
three different per diem argument conditions. Conse-
quently, all of the explanations we have discussed, al-
though consistent with previous theory and research, 
were generated post hoc. Future studies will benefit by 
including dependent measures that specifically tap par-
ticipants’ perceptions of whether the attorney’s award 
recommendation is excessive, discrepant from partici-
pants’ initial award judgments, or an overly biased at-
tempt to influence their judgments.
Although it is too early to draw definitive conclusions, 
we would like to close by considering some potential im-
plications of our results for the legal community. First, at-
torneys using per diem arguments would be well advised 
to choose dollar/time quantifications that are smaller in 
size and thus appear more modest to jurors who may be 
evaluating the per diem argument using a more superfi-
cial type of processing rather than performing the calcula-
tion suggested by the attorney in the per diem argument. 
Attorneys who would rather avoid the Goldilocks-like 
guesswork inherent in determining whether a dollar/
time quantification is “too large, too small, or just right” 
may wish simply to avoid the use of per diem arguments 
altogether and stick with a lump sum amount. Recall that 
when differences between per diem arguments and lump 
sums emerged, they were in the negative direction with 
per diem arguments reducing (not increasing) partici-
pants’ damage awards for the plaintiff.
With respect to judges, some jurisdictions do not al-
low per diem arguments based on the assumption that 
these arguments artificially and excessively inflate ju-
rors’ damage awards. Our findings regarding different 
dollar/time quantifications of the same amount indi-
cate that this is not the case. In fact, when larger dol-
lar/time quantifications are used, per diem arguments 
may result in smaller damage awards for plaintiffs com-
pared to lump sums or smaller dollar/time quantifi-
cations. Per diem arguments also do not lead to a per-
ception of a more effective closing argument. Our data 
do, however, indicate that some per diem arguments 
may increase the variability in jurors’ damage awards 
compared to a lump sum amount or no recommenda-
tion. This of course is less desirable because it suggests 
that per diem arguments may lead to different awards 
for the same injury. Public perceptions of injustice are 
bound to increase if like cases are not treated alike by 
our legal system. Future research using different dollar 
amounts and time units in different types of cases will 
help us better understand how the variability, as well as 
size, of jurors’ pain and suffering awards is influenced 
by attorneys’ use of per diem arguments. 
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